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The Scales of Justice in Peru:
Judicial Reform and Fundamental Rights
César Landa
‘Expenditure on justice is  the second priority of a ruler’
Wealth of Nations
Adam Smith
For several years, the Peruvian government has been carrying out an
intense campaign in preparation for judicial reform in Peru. The
government has received extensive technical and financial support from
foreign governments and multilateral loan organisations. However, when
the members of the National Council of Justices resigned in the first half
of 1998 the World Bank decided to suspend its US$22.5 million backing
and those responsible for the judicial reform subsequently resigned.
It is extraordinary that the Peruvian government, with everything
in its favour for the implementation of a judicial reform, should
remain at the starting line after years of study and preparation. To
what is the lack of confidence of the National Council of Justices in the
present judicial policy owed? Do the economic reforms introduced in
the country at such a high cost to society not require the creation of an
efficient, independent and honest judicial administration? Was the re-
election of President Fujimori a factor that hindered the existence of
an efficient, independent and honest judicial administration? There is
no absolute answer to these questions, but in the process of seeking
answers one can find some explanations to the problem which lies at
the root of the judicial question: the lack of protection of fundamental
rights is directly related to the limits placed upon judicial
independence in a nominal state of law. This brings to mind the old
adage that a government without a judicial control system plants the
seed of its own destruction.1
In this sense, the tutelage of fundamental rights by the judicial
power must be considered in relationship to the judicial reform itself.
On the one hand, some key issues such as the better organisation of
judicial throughput, the technical selection of judges and their ongoing
training, as well as better salaries and discipline, have been broached.
On the other, there has been little or no attention to subjects which
people find sensitive but which are indispensable to any type of judicial
reform: judicial independence in a presidential regime, legal culture,
juridical formalism, the judges’ role in the country’s development and
judicial honesty. The purpose of these is the defence of fundamental
                                                 
1 Karl Loewenstein (1959) Verfassungslehre (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr), p. 335; Charles
Howard McIlwain (1991) Constitucionalismo antiguo y moderno (Madrid: CEC), p. 37.
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rights, without which any type of judicial reform has no sense or
validity. 2
The judicial reform process
The judicial branch in Peru has always been criticised for its inability to
provide justice and for the poor quality of its jurisdictional function, as
a result of its lack of independence from the political power, economic
groups and, nowadays, the military power.3 It has also been criticised
for the lack of uniform jurisprudential criteria, social insensitivity and,
above all, corruption. Inadequate substantive and procedural codes,
improvised judicial work systems and the lack of job security for judges
along with all of the aforementioned characterise the third power of
the state.4 Nonetheless, the guardianship of rights is treated as a
marginal duty and not a priority of the judiciary.
One of the self-justifications for Fujimori’s coup d’état in 1992 was
the state of the administration of justice, ‘dominated by political
sectarianism, venality and irresponsible attitudes … a scandal which
continuously causes democracy and the law to lose prestige’,5 not the
dramatic lack of protection for the people’s rights. The government
has been carrying out judicial administration reforms based on this
perception which is as elemental as it is unfocused. The said reforms
can be succinctly surveyed in two parts.
The replacement of judges
The first stage of the judicial reform was initiated after the presidential
coup d’état of 1992. This reform started with decrees removing the
Supreme Court justices and the judges of the Superior Courts from
office. The same was done with regard to the judges of the Tribunal of
Constitutional Guarantees, which, along with other democratic
                                                 
2 Germán Bidart Campos (1966) El derecho constitucional humanitario (Buenos Aires:
Ediar), p. 11; Germán Bidart Campos (1988) ‘Constitución y democracia en el nuevo mundo’
in Fix Zamudio et al. Constitución y democracia en el nuevo mundo (Universidad Externado
de Colombia), p. 27.
3 Report by the International Jurists Commission (1994) Sobre la administración de justicia
en el Perú (Lima: IDL); Javier de Belaúnde et al. (1991) Poder Judicial y democracia, (Diego
García-Sayán, ed.) (Lima: CAJ-CIJA), pp. 21–58. Juan Monroy (1990) Poder judicial a 10 años
de vigencia de la Constitución de 1979 (Lima); José Martin Pallín (1989) Perú: la
independencia del poder judicial, report for the CIJA-CIJ (Lima); Luis Pásara (1982) Jueces,
justicia y poder en el Perú (Lima: CEDYS); and Domingo García Rada (1978) Memorias de
un Juez  (Lima: Andina).
4 From the government perspective: José Dellepiani (1996) ‘La reforma judicial en el Perú: una
propuesta de modernización y reorganización del sistema de administración de justicia’, a
presentation made in the Seminar-Workshop, ‘Reforma Judicial en el Perú: Logros y Retos. En
Busca de un Plan de Mediano Plazo’, Academia de la Magistratura, Lima, March 12–14; Ministry
of Justice (1994) Foro Nuevas Perspectivas para la Reforma Integral de la Administración de
Justicia en el Perú, backed by the United Nations Development Programme (Lima).
5 Alberto Fujimori, ‘Manifiesto a la Nación del 5 de Abril de 1992’, La República, Lima
edition, 5 June 1992, p. 5.
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institutions, was shut down. At the same time, legislation expressly
forbade the initiation of amparo (judicial review) proceedings to review
the situation of the judges.
The de facto government then proceeded to appoint new Supreme
Court justices and Superior Court judges in accordance with the political
objectives of national reconstruction and on the grounds of the need to
reform the national administration of justice. These political objectives were
the implementation of a free market economy and the fight against
terrorism, but did not address the problems of corruption and the
judiciary’s lack of independence and also ignored the basic lack of
protection of the people’s rights. Yet a government spokesman stated, ‘The
survival of the democratic system as well as the important economic reforms
introduced by the present government will not be possible without an
efficient administration of justice which answers the needs of modern
society...’6
In accordance with such modern judicial ideology, the officialist
majority7 of the Democratic Constitutional Congress included a group of
old and new judicial institutions in the 1993 Constitution. The most
noteworthy are: 1) judicial principles which consecrate due process and
judicial tutelage, judicial control of laws, recognition of common justice
and the election of lower court judges and justices of the peace; 2)
reorganised institutions such as the Supreme Court, transformed basically
into a court of causation; the National Magistrates Council was put in
charge of appointing and sanctioning judges; the Ombudsman’s Office
became an autonomous entity; the Constitutional Court was to be the
ruling court for cases concerning basic rights; and the National Electoral
College was to be put in charge of administrating and holding elections.
These constitutional dispositions increasing the independence of the
judicial power were favourably received in so far as they separated the
judicial power from the hegemonic constitutional institutions resulting
from the presidential re-election and the strengthening of the military
justice system.8
However, the implementation of the new institutions and
constitutional organisms was also limited by government development
legislation which curbed their constitutional powers. The judicial
supervision and control powers of such entities as the Constitutional
Court, the Ombudsman’s Office and, later, the National Magistrates
Council were reduced. Likewise, in March 1993, prior to the
implementation of the new Constitution, the government itself created a
                                                 
6 Minister of Justice Ricardo Santa Gadea, ‘Introducción’, in Ministerio de Justicia, Foro
Nuevos Perspectivas, p. 9.
7 The term ‘officialist’ is an adaptation of the Spanish term used when the majority members
of parliament or congress are members of the president’s party.
8 Francisco Fernández Segado (1996) ‘El nuevo ordenamiento constitucional del Perú.
Aproximación a la Constitución de 1993’, in La Constitución de 1993: Análisis y comentarios
(Lima: CAJ), pp. 49–55; and Javier de Belaúnde (1996) ‘Elección popular de jueces’, pp. 209–
17 in the same volume.
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Magistrates Court of Honour,9 composed of well-known judges,
charged with reviewing the cases of the judges who had been
dismissed. Nevertheless, within two months of its installation the
reorganised Supreme Court transferred its power to administer justice
in regard to a paramilitary group to the military justice system,
declaring that the kidnapping, assassination and incineration of a
professor and nine students from ‘La Cantuta’ University was a
military crime and not an assassination.10
Along with the abdication of judicial authority in favour of the
prevailing political and military powers, it can be said that judicial
processes continued to show marked levels of corruption as well as a
distinct lack of respect for the rights of due process and the judicial
tutelage of the people. Thus, a foreign juridical commission could state
without qualification that ‘the practical effects of President Fujimori’s
reorganisation of the judicial power and its associate institutions on 5
April 1992 were the cause of a serious limitation on, or the actual
elimination of, the institutional independence of the courts’.11
Modernisation and judicial dependence
In 1995, the government began the second stage of the reform. For this
purpose, Law No. 26623 created the Judicial Coordination Council and
the technical secretariats in the Poder Judicial and the office of the
Attorney General, which were provided with exorbitant powers to create
courts, the right to propose law projects, responsibility for the budget, the
power to appoint provisional judges, etc. President Fujimori appointed
José Dellepiane, an ex-marine commander closely connected to his
regime, as the head of the judicial reform process. Thus, it was pointed
out with some justification that ‘the concentration of power in the
reorganisation of the judicial power in two people, one of them known for
his close ties with the executive power and the armed forces, is a step off
the path towards the urgently needed independence of the judicial power
in Peru’.12
The constitutionality of Law No. 26623 was questioned by the
Arequipa Bar Association in the Constitutional Court in 1996, the case
being the first to be ruled upon by the court. Despite the fact that five
of the seven judges considered the law to be unconstitutional, it was
                                                 
9 See the constitutional laws of 12 March and December 1993 of the Democratic
Constitutional Congress and Domingo García Belaúnde and Francisco Fernández Segado, La
Constitución de 1993: Análisis y comentarios, pp. 238 and 247.
10 APRODEH (1994) De la tierra brotó la verdad. Crimen e impunidad en el caso La Cantuta,
(Lima), p. 72.
11 International Jurists Commission (1994) Informe sobre la administración de justicia en el
Perú (Lima: IDL), pp. 79–86; This report resulted from an agreement between the
governments of Peru and the United States for a commission to evaluate the most important
characteristics of the Peruvian judicial system and the legal and constitutional reforms
introduced.
12 Human Rights Watch/Americas (1996) Peru, Presumption of Guilt, Human Rights
Violations and the Faceless Courts in Peru (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch), p. 15.
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pronounced constitutional in accordance with Article 4 of the
Constitutional Court Organic Law, which establishes that six votes are
needed in order to declare a law unconstitutional. Two magistrates,
Acosta and García, both publicly known as being pro-government, did
not deem the law to be unconstitutional.13 As can be seen, this voting
system established by the officialist parliamentary majority permits the
minority to hold sway over the majority.14
The institutionalising of government intervention in the
administration of justice, grounded in a project of ostensible
modernisation did not reduce the insecurity of the judges’ position.
According to official figures, only 403 (26 per cent) of the 1,473 judges
in 1997 had tenure; the remaining 1,070 were substitutes (59 per cent)
or provisional (15 per cent) judges. Moreover, 16 of the 32 justices of
the Supreme Court were provisional.15 Subsequently, these figures
have not varied substantially. This means that approximately 75 per
cent of Peru’s judges are insecure in the exercise of their positions and
thus susceptible to political intervention and active or passive
jurisdictional dependence. As a rule, this holds true at all levels of the
justice administration, from the highest to the lowest courts.
Such judicial instability was exacerbated by the Judicial Power
Executive Commission’s exercise of its authority to appoint and dismiss
provisional judges, taking over the role of a constitutional organism such
as the National Council of Magistrates (NCM). The NCM could not
appoint the justices to the Supreme Court or judges to any other because
the National Magistrates Academy (NMA), responsible for training the
judges for their higher appointment, was subordinate to the Executive
Commission: ‘I can understand that the NCM is uncomfortable about not
being able to appoint the judges, but the needs of the judicial reform are
others’.16 It has justifiably been said that ‘while on one hand, the Judicial
Power Executive Commission has been very strict and resistant about
appointing permanent judges, on the other, it has been very lenient and
informal about designating substitute and provisional judges in the
different jurisdictional courts created as a part of the reform’.17
In July 1997, the Lima Bar Association declared: ‘In the last few
months, Peru has witnessed a series of events which, taken together, point
to a systematic weakening of the rule of law, the hub and framework of the
democratic system … In this context, the judicial power and the Attorney
General’s Office serve those who govern us, so that when their arbitrary
                                                 
13 Manuel Aguirre Roca, ‘Nacimiento, via crucis y muerte del tribunal constitucional del
Perú’, La Constitución de 1993: Análisis y comentarios, pp. 128.
14 César Landa (1997) ‘Balance del primer año del Tribunal Constitucional del Perú’, in
Pensamiento Constitucional, year IV, no. 4 (Lima: PUCP-MDC, Fondo Editorial), p. 251.
15 José Dellepiane (1997) Reforma y modernización del poder judicial (Lima: Judicial Power),
p. 23.
16 Interview with Francisco Equiguren, director of the National Magistrates Academy, in the
daily newspaper Expreso, 13 August 1997.
17 Gorki Gonzáles (1997) Jurisdicción y poder político en el Perú, unpublished PhD. thesis,
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima, p. 41.
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and corrupt actions are questioned through suits for amparo, habeas
corpus, or other legal accusations, the interested and fearful judges dress
up said actions in the guise of legality and innocence, thus lessening the
impact of the questions presented by the media and society. Hence it is
obvious in the best interest of the ruling party that the majority of the
judges be provisional and not permanent in order to better manipulate
them …’18 Likewise, the president of the magistrates’ guild declared in
August 1997 that the judiciary is undergoing one of the worst
experiences in its history. To overcome this, he suggested the
disbanding of the Coordination Council and allowing the presidents of
the Superior Courts as well as the Supreme Court to appoint the
judges.19
Nevertheless, the Executive Commission of the Judiciary had the
support of several directors and in particular that of the president of the
Lima Superior Court at that time, Marcos Ibazeta, who promoted the
reform while he remained in office. The presidents of the Superior Courts
of Justice have made annual declarations concerning the reform of the
judicial system. In one such declaration, they stated that, ‘The reform of
the judiciary in Peru is part of the reform of the justice administration
system. It is a role model for developing countries and its degree of
advancement allows one to foresee the complete achievement of its
objectives in terms of juridical security, substantial advance in the fight
against corruption, foresightedness and trustworthiness as elements on
which peaceful and secure national development should be built.’20 This
illustrates their deafness to popular opinion and to civil social institutions.
Another important factor in the second stage of the judicial reform
is the lack of confidence, both in general and within specialist circles,
due to the fact that the judicial players — legal guilds, jurists,
universities and litigants — do not take part in the fundamental
decisions of the reform process. This fact stems from the lack of
democratic consensus in governmental action in general, contributing
to the lack of transparency and effectiveness of the judicial reform.21
These cases make it evident why the judiciary has, according to public
opinion, for some years been among the most inefficient and corrupt
Peruvian institutions.22
In April 1998 the second stage of the judicial reform came to an end as
a result of Law No. 26933, which cut back the controlling powers of the
National Council of Magistrates over judges and justices. The legislation
                                                 
18 Lima Bar Association, ‘Comunicado: reforma judicial o qué…’, in the daily newspaper La
República, 27 July 1997.
19 Statement by José García, president of the National Association of Magistrates, to La
República, 11 August 1997.
20 Press announcement published in most newspapers on 14 August 1997.
21 See the opinions of Roberto MacLean and Domingo García Belaúnde (1993), Pensamiento
Constitucional, year V, no. 5 (Lima), pp. 185–208.
22 DEBATE Magazine, Encuesta del Poder, Apoyo, Lima, July–August 1998, p. 39. Likewise,
in La República, 11 August 1997, a poll carried out by analysts and consultants showed that
78% of those polled did not have confidence in the judiciary and that only 13% did.
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was approved precisely when an investigation had been opened against
several Supreme Court justices, in particular César Tineo Cabrera.
The justices were accused of prevarication — having altered the vote
— in the case of Novotec versus the Central Reserve Bank. These
individuals were the same people who, a few months earlier, had ruled
that the re-election of President Fujimori in the year 2000 would be
constitutional. The measure in favour of the judges approving the
presidential re-election together with harassment of the judicial
reformers was the primary motive for the resignation of seven of the
NCM judges led by Parodi Remón, Roger Rodríiguez and Carlos
Montoya.
This disgraceful episode resulted in the World Bank suspending
and later cancelling a US$22.5 million loan that had not yet been
disbursed.23 The decision was followed by the renunciation of the ex-
marine Dellepiane as the author of the judicial reform. Dellepiane had
begun to understand that:
… the interference of the political power added to corruption destroys the
concept of the balance of justice. Both are present, and this situation is what
makes us immediately conclude that what our country needs is an iron
judge … Justice has been diluted. That is why in order to exercise authentic
jurisdictional tutelage we need a justice system … But first, I believe that
Congress must have a serious debate concerning the content of the
Constitution and its results. After a year and eight months of administrative
reform, it is time to stop talking about a reform of the reform and lead the
discussion into another area and decide to change justice in general.24
The second stage of the judicial reform may, then, be characterised as
increasing political intervention by the government, through the so-
called modernisation promoted by the government and supported
financially by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank as well as by technical cooperation from the governments of
Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and multilateral and
governmental cooperation agencies such as United Nations
Development Programme and the European Union, despite the
political leanings of many of them.
Unfortunately, all this international economic support only served
to facilitate government political intervention in the judiciary and to
make the interests of the judiciary dependent upon the re-election of
President Fujimori and the judicial impunity of the armed forces. This
has led to the suppression of fundamental rights.
                                                 
23 Roberto MacLean, ‘La justicia cuesta abajo. A seis años de iniciada la reforma judicial los
oficialistas en el Congreso de la República se han convertido en su peor enemigo’, in Caretas,
no. 1534, 17 Sept. 1998. at http://www.caretas/com.pe/1998/1534/justicia/justicia.htm.
24 Declarations by José Dellepiane, ‘Cambiar la justicia en general’, in La República, 8 Sept.
1997. Likewise, Roberto MacLean (1997) ‘Réquiem para el espíritu del legislador: la cultura
de servicio en la administración de justicia’, in El papel del derecho internacional en América.
La soberanía nacional en la era de la integración regional (Mexico: UNAM), pp. 333–57.
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The status of the judiciary
Judicial reform is a policy of the state and not just of one government
because the protection of the people’s rights is a fundamental concept of
the rule of law. Any judicial reform should be backed by a social consensus
if it is to be capable of reformulating judicial problems regarding the
defence of fundamental rights and not deal merely with the limited
structural and organisational aspects, as has been the case in Peru.
The politicisation of the justice system
The crisis in the justice system dramatically evident in Peru during the
1990s has been due to a new political phenomenon: the death of
political representation.25 In effect, the crisis in party legitimacy has
distanced formal political activity from popular expectations for the
solution of the country’s overarching social conflicts. The solution to
social conflicts has moved progressively from the political arena to the
courts.26 This has produced the judicialisation of politics, judges
finding themselves constitutionally obliged to rule on and act as
arbitrators in matters of great political consequence. This is a process
for which they are not well prepared, since the Peruvian judiciary has
tended to measure matters in terms of legality instead of constitutional
law. Because of this one can say that the judges have not judicially
domesticated politics but rather, that justice has been politicised as
never before.27 The OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission
has stated that the Executive Commissions and the Attorney General’s
Office directly intervened in and reduced the autonomy of other
judicial institutions.28 Likewise, ‘although the Constitution calls for an
independent judiciary, in practice the judicial system is inefficient,
often corrupt and apparently easily manipulated by the executive
branch’.29
In February 1994, the Supreme Court convened to decide whether a
criminal case against an army paramilitary group accused of killing a
teacher and nine students from the La Cantuta University should be tried
                                                 
25 Domingo García Belaúnde (1995) ‘Representación y partidos políticos: el caso del Perú’, in
Pensamiento Constitucional, no. 2, 1995, p. 59.
26 Pedro de Vega (1995) ‘Democracia, representación y partidos políticos’, in Pensamiento
Constitucional, no. 2, p. 11; Francisco Rubio Llorente (1988) El parlamento y la
representación política, in Congreso de los Diputados, I Jornadas de Derecho Parlamentario,
vol. 1 (Madrid), p. 145.
27 Javier de Belaúnde (1998) ‘Reforma de la administración de justicia’, in Pensamiento
Constitucional, year 5, no. 5 (Lima), pp. 200–3; César Landa, ‘Independencia y reforma
judicial en el Perú’, conference given in the programme ‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Justiz und
Verfassungswirklichkeit in Peru’, Jugendzentrum, Nürnberg, 26 March 1998, p. 6.
28 ‘Intervención en órganos de justicia’, El Comercio, 23 November 1998; See
http://www.infobanco.com.pe/webcomercio/231198/005212.htm.
29 This observation reflects a change in the United States Government position. For further details see
US State Department, Peru, Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 1998, available on the
internet  at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/peru.html.
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in the civilian courts or in the military courts.30 One day before the
Supreme Court ruling — which was expected to be in favour of the
civilian courts — the congressional majority unexpectedly and without the
least regard for established parliamentary practice passed Law No. 26291,
transferring jurisdiction of the La Cantuta case to the military courts.
Making a mockery of the civil courts, the Criminal Branch of the Supreme
Court endorsed this legislative measure although there were some votes
against.31
In another case, in June 1995, a lower court judge opened a
criminal case against the Colina paramilitary group, which included
senior and medium ranking officers, for the death of several residents
of the Barrios Altos. But, due to military pressure, Congress passed
Law No. 26479 granting amnesty to the members of the armed forces
who had committed crimes against human rights.32 Nevertheless, in
accordance with Article 138 of the 1993 Constitution, which establishes
that a judge should give a constitutional norm precedence over a legal
norm when these are incompatible, the judge handling the Barrios
Altos case decided to continue processing the members of the armed
forces involved in the killings. The decision was based on formal legal
arguments, but before the superior courts could rule the congressional
majority passed a second amnesty law, Law No. 26492, which
established that amnesty laws were not subject to scrutiny by the
judiciary. This mandate was dutifully accepted by both the Superior
Court judges and Supreme Court justices.33
In November 1996, the Superior Court decided that Judge Minaya
would cease to handle the habeas corpus action on behalf of ex-general
Rodolfo Robles since the judge had requested the presence of court
officials at the Real Felipe military base to ensure the fulfilment of his
release order. Next, in February 1997, the Executive Commission to
the Judiciary suddenly deactivated the recently-created Superior Court
for drug trafficking cases, just before it was to begin judicial processes
for drug trafficking involving high-ranking officers of the armed
forces.
These cases are not the exception but rather the norm under the
judicial reform in Peru. In June 1997, the government stripped the
owner of TV channel 2, Baruch Ivcher, of his Peruvian nationality
following televised accusations based on confidential information from
the National Intelligence Service. The judiciary subsequently ratified
                                                 
030 APRODEH (1994) De la tierra brotó la verdad, Crimen e impunidad en el caso La
Cantuta (Lima), pp. 45–55.
31 Criminal Branch of the Supreme Court (1994) Contienda de Competencia no. 7–94.
CSJM–16 J.P. Lima (Lima), p. 4; State Department (1993) Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1992, p. 475 and (1995) Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1994, p.
482, Joint Committee publications, Washington, DC.
32 APRODEH (1996) I Foro ético jurídico sobre la impunidad (Lima), p. 20.
33 César Landa, ‘Límites constitucionales de la ley de amnistía peruana’, in Pensamiento
Constitucional, year 3, no. 3, Lima, 1996, p. 151. Ronald Gamarra and Robert Meza (1995)
Ley de amnistía (impunidad), constitución y derecho humanos, working paper (Lima), 52 pp.
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this move. Immediately afterwards, in August 1997, the Supreme
Court laid criminal charges against three independent Superior Court
judges who had ruled against the Supreme Council of Military Justice.
Between September 1997 and April 1998, Barreto, a former National
Intelligence Service agent, was tortured and killed. A second agent, La
Rosa, was tortured by military justice. A third agent was harassed for
supposedly giving information to the press about the illegal activities of
the paramilitary group, ‘Colina’, responsible for the La Cantuta and
Barrios Altos killings, illegal wire-tapping and other crimes. Currently,
the survivor and a colleague are outside Peru, one as a United Nations
refugee and the other as a political refugee in the United States.
In February 1998, in the amparo suit against the parliamentary
decision arbitrarily removing three Constitutional Court judges from
office after they had declared the presidential re-election law to be
inapplicable, the Supreme Court duly ratified the removal of the
judges. In May 1998, Delia Revoredo, a dean of the Lima Bar
Association — the premier lawyers’ guild in Peru — sought asylum
with her family in Costa Rica for several months because, as an ex-
judge of the Constitutional Court who had been removed by Congress,
she had become troublesome for the government. At the same time,
the judiciary initiated procedures against her and her husband for
supposed tax evasion. All of these cases have been the subject of
demands presented to the Inter-American Human Rights System.34
They make it evident that the government does not subscribe to the
belief that ‘the idea of constitutional justice is the offspring of the
“constitutional” culture or what is in fact the same thing, the
conception of democracy based on the guarantee of individual liberty
and of social and political pluralism. Thus it demands a “limited
government” which recognises the constitution as the highest law of
the land.’35
Although justice in Peru has never been a value or process isolated
from political power,36 the deterioration of the democratic power of the
state has led to what we can call a marked informalism and narcotism
within the justice administration. The jurisdictional function is more
unstable and insecure than before because the traditional public
powers have begun ceding their authority to the executive, including
the military, as well as to private interests led by the media. Thus, the
                                                 
34 ‘Comisión Interamericana expresa preocupación por violación a los DD.HH’, El Comercio,
9 Oct. 1998, see http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/fs5n3.htm.
35 Antonio Baldassarre (1997) ‘Parlamento y justicia constitucional en el derecho comparado’,
in Francesc Pau i Vall (coordinator) Parlamento y Justicia Constitucional, IV Jornadas de la
Asociación Española de Letrados de Parlamentos (Madrid: Aranzadi), p. 183.
36 Juan López Aguilar (1986) La justicia y sus problemas en la Constitución (Madrid: Tecnos),
p. 109; Miguel García Herrera (1996) ‘Poder judicial y estado social: legalidad y resistencia
constitucional’, in Perfecto Ibáñez (ed.) Corrupción y Estado de Derecho. El papel de la
jurisdición (Madrid: Editorial Trotta), p. 59; Raúl Olivera and Manuel Olivera (1985)
Corrupción en el poder judicial y en el ministerio  público (Lima: Editorial San Marcos), pp.
21 and 57.
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informalisation of the rule of law is transferred to the judiciary, thanks
to the culture of juridical positivism that subordinates justice to
power.37
The culture of legal positivism
The dramatic situation of justice in Peru can be explained by the
dialectic of formal justice and political decision-making, which have
turned the judges into functionaries of the government rather than of
the state.38 In effect, the reasoning behind the judges participation in
political cases is characterised by normative and decisive positivism,
which has effectively created an autistic jurisprudence. That is to say
that the arguments and proofs of its pre-judgement of cases are not
valued or are purposefully not considered. This has created a judicial
arena outside normal procedure and the media has, in effect, become a
de facto judge in Peru. This is in sharp contrast to a communicative
jurisprudence based on constitutional principles and juridical
interpretation methods at the service of society rather than the state
with the aim not only of providing a reasonable amount of juridical
security for the people but also the juridical tolerance and pluralism
necessary for the construction of democratic societies.39 Communicative
justice,40 based on non-traditional judicial principles and
interpretation, is that which seeks not only juridical security but also
reasonableness within the bounds of the established constitutional
order which respects the fundamental principles of due process and
judicial tutelage.
These practices are rarely encountered in judicial processes and
their administration due to the fact that judicial positivism goes hand
in hand with the traditional obsequiousness of judges to the law — be
this constitutional or not — and with more direct dependence on the
political will of those in power. This has produced a vacuum and a
failure in the administration of justice, as seen in the haphazard and
unrealistic sentencing. Sentences are obscure and elliptical, making it
impossible for the interested party to understand and the rights
conceded or denied depend more on the judge than the law. Hence,
rather than being conservative or liberal, justice is in many political
cases detached from established practice, reality and social expectation.
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In part, this dramatic situation is simply explicable in terms of the lack
of judicial independence and the minimal professional training of many
judges, who carry out their functions on the one hand by means of the
formalist traditions of judicial process and on the other through informal
procedures at the service of public and private powers. As a result, public
opinion predictably takes the view that the judges apply the law with an
iron fist against their enemies and with a velvet glove for their friends.41
It can, then, be shown that the legal reasoning of the majority of the
common judges is tied to a positivist judicial argument which makes it
vulnerable to corruption of a different order. Nevertheless, it is necessary
to point out that there are several positivist judicial reasoning models: a)
the syllogistic model of submission of the case to a pre-established norm;
b) the realist model in which the judge first decides and later justifies; c)
the judicial discretion model which defends the political power of the
judge, and; d) the correct answer model, where the judge does not have
the right to discretion and therefore has no political power.42
From this range of possibilities, it can be surmised that Peruvian justice
is effectively immersed in a positivist-normative concept. The judges are
only the bouche qui prononce la parole de la loi, disconnecting the norm
from reality. That is to say, they do not incorporate concrete social reality
and doctrinal phenomena in the judicial reasoning. The inclusion of the
latter would justify the existence of their role of administrating justice as a
function of the protection of the fundamental rights, which is the best
manner of assuring civilian legitimacy and of affirming the constitution.43
It is evident that the judicial reform has not addressed factors such
as the legal culture of the judges and the lawyers, the legal training
offered in the universities and the legal idiosyncrasies of Peruvian
society. Such actors respond to juridical reasoning schemes which,
consciously or unconsciously, have a direct impact on any judicial
reform.
Although as already noted, justice has never been isolated from
political power, its lack of independence is more obvious than ever
before due to President Fujimori’s re-election, which has compromised
the entire structure of the state. The informalisation of the state as well
as the dependence of the administration of justice on the political and
private powers have grown significantly. The informalisation of the
rule of law has not only moved fully into the judicial realm, it has
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infinitely increased the mechanisms of pressure and control affecting
judicial decisions crucial for the government.44 The leading
representatives of this practice are the judicial power reformers
themselves.
In consequence, legal formalism not only operates in the interests
of the government and allied private powers, it also leaves the
fundamental rights defenceless and does not consider the social
consensus on which the application of any norm should be founded.45
Thus, in a democracy with relativist governors, without values, a
disintegrated party system and an indecisive constitution, which is
distinct from an open constitution,46 the authorities have been able to
secure re-election by using the judiciary as but one instrument of total
power.47
Conclusion
The judiciary has always been the object of criticism for being at the
service of the powerful and the reigning government. That lack of judicial
legitimacy has been reinforced by the reform initiated by the Fujimori
government with subordination to the political authority having been
consolidated by corruption and ineffectiveness. The judicial reform is
characterised by the direct intervention of the executive branch in the
judiciary in order to secure the re-election of Fujimori in the year 2000.
In order to secure an authentic reform of the administration of justice,
the judicial function must be at the service of the people’s rights. In other
words, the existence of the judiciary is justified by the protection of human
rights from excesses by the government and private powers. This means
that the judges must vary their position with regard to the law because,
although the fundamental rights were once only valid within the limits of
the law, now the law is only valid within the limits of the fundamental
rights.48 This is true in so far as the constitution is the supreme juridical
expression of the will of the constitutional power which is based on the
democratic principle of the sovereignty of the people and which exists to
protect the fundamental rights of the people.
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